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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MAVIS E. BATT and GARY ALAN
BATT, DOUGLAS LAVERNE
BATT, RONALD AARON BATT,
and DANIE JAMES BATT, minors
by their Guardian ad Litem BROOKE
WELLS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Case No.
12639

vs.

THE STATE OF UTAH and JACK
B. PARSON CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEl\iIENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
On August 26, 1969 at approximately 10:00 P.M.
Charles Batt and his son, David Batt, were killed in an
automobile collision.
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This is a wrongful death action by the surviving
widow and children of Charles Batt, and the heirs of
David Batt. Plaintiffs claim the collision and deaths re·
sulted from the negligent construction, maintenance and
control of U.S. highway 89-91 by the defendants, State
of Utah and Parson Construction Company.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
After trial, the jury by special interrogatories found
the defendant State of Utah guilty of negligence, the
defendant Parson Construction Company not guilty of
negligence and the decedents guilty of contributory negligence, which proximately contributed to the accident.
The court entered judgments against the plaintiffs upon
said special interrogatories of no cause of action.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek a reversal of the judgment as a matter of law, and a new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The trial of this case took almost six full days. The
record is voluminous. The exhibits are numerous. The
facts, however, are not greatly in dispute and for an
orderly determination of this appeal, it is not necessary
to state the facts in great detail. Appellants complain
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that the trial court improperly prohibited the jury from
considering plaintiffs' theory of the case, both by its instructions to the jury, and by its ruling upon crucial
evidentiary problems.
In a nutshell the facts are as follows: The decedents, residents of California, traveling northward
through Utah on an unlighted and unfamiliar road, in
the night time on August 26, 1969, came upon a black
and darkened stretch of highway "89-91" north of Ogden near the Hotsprings station, that had recently been
resurfaced with black asphalt by the defendant Parson
Construction Company under a contract with the State
of Utah. The gravamen of the defendants' conduct was
that though the portion of the highway had been newly
resurfaced with black asphalt, the defendants had failed
to delineate in any manner the center of the highway for
north and southbound traffic, and had placed a single
white painted skip line upon the highway, which skip
line ultimately was to constitute the dividing line between the two southbound lanes of traffic. Defendants
failed to advise the motoring public in any manner as to
where the center of the highway actually was, or
whether the painted white line upon the highway constituted a center line. The driver of the Batt vehicle obviously interpreted the skip line as the center line.

It was apparent from the physical facts that the de-

cedents were driving northbound to the right of the
white painted skip line and collided head on with the
Grundvig vehicle proceeding southbound.
3.

Pictures taken by the investigating officers showed
with great detail the path of the Batt vehicle in the new
asphalt leading up to the impact and the configuration
and character of the tire marks. Ex. P-5, and Ex. P-9
are reproduced on the following pages to illustrate the
tire marks and the skip line.
There was adequate, competent testimony that the
method used by the defendants in resurfacing the highway and painting a skip line without also painting a
center line or placing temporary center line markings or
other warnings on the road was hazardous and contrary
to established practice, as well as the very rules and regulations of the defendant State of Utah.
The thrust of the defense was that the proximate
cause of the accident was the speed of the decedent
driver; but as it will be demonstrated in the arguments
that follow hereafter, this finding required first, ignoring the eye witness, second, the introduction of opinion
based upon (a) improperly qualified witnesses, and (b)
qualified witnesses without sufficient foundation, and
third, instructions from the Court that a finding of speed
over an assumed posted speed limit would constitute the
sole proximate cause of the accident and hence a directed verdict against the plaintiffs.
Further, the finding as to defendant Parson Construction Company had to turn on a further instruction
from the Court that the defendant Parson Construction
Company was free from liability if the decendent driver
failed to heed any signs upon the highway.

4
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Though this Court did not request that the transcript be abstracted, in support of the broad ultimate fact
statements set forth above, and viewing the testimony in
light most favorable to the defendants, the record abstracted will show the following:
PLAINTIFF'S CASE
I. Van Dell H endersen: He is the only eye witness

to any of the decedents' conduct preceding the collision.
He was traveling in the same direction as the decedents
and observed them approximately at the weigh station.
He describes the conditions as very dark and confusing,
though he himself was thoroughly familiar with the highway and the construction. He observed the decedents on
his left some distance past the weigh station and observed the decedents slightly drifting towards him to the
right. He looked at the driver of the vehicle and described his countenance as startled. The witness then
sped his car up to approximately 40 to 45 miles per hour,
moved ahead and away from the decedents, and then in
his rear view mirror observed the collision. (R-290-320)
2. Virginia Macavinta: She lived on the highway

right near the scene of the accident. She had traveled
north over the same route earlier the same evening. She
described the road as black and confusing and that she
literally had to "feel her way" along the highway. At the
time of the accident, she was sitting on her porch, heard
no screech of brakes, saw no dust, but only heard the
thump of the accident. (R-321-326)
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3. Allen Gines: The investigating officer, described

in detail the physical marks left on the highway from the
respective vehicles, describing the Batt vehicle tire marks
as marks left in new asphalt by a turning vehicle shifting
weight. They are represented in detail on Exhibit 70-D,
the officer's original sketch, and Exhibit 39-P, a diagram of the entire area as it existed. (See pgs. 2627) . The physical evidence shows that the decedents traveled approximately 1,000 feet on 1lhe new
asphalt and then turned left towards the white painted skip line and then turned back to the right where
the collision occurred at a point where the actual
center of the road would be. The Court refused to
allow Officer Gines to characterize the condition as
hazardous or dangerous, but on cross examination
by defendants allowed him to characterize the tire
marks left by the decedents' vehicle in the fresh asphalt
in accident reconstruction expert terms as "critical speed
scuffs," for the obvious purpose of supporting later
opinion evidence as to speed. Gines further testified regarding a prior daylight occurrence where another northbound motorist construed the white line to be the center
line. (R-327-441)
4. William B. Rigby: A truck driver who was thor-

oughly familiar with the road, passed through the area
going north just after the accident, described the condition that night as confusing, looking like a mass of cars
going both ways; no way to tell how wide the road was
or how many lanes of traffic on the highway, and no
warning signs of the condition. (R-341-355)
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5. Arnold Grundvig, Jr.: The motorist who collided

with the Batt vehicle, remembered nothing leading up to
the collision except a sudden flash of lights followed by
the crash. ( R-449-451)

6. Paul F. Williams: A highway patrolman stationed at the Hotsprings station also described a prior
incident where a northbound motorist in the night time
apparently thought the white line constituted the center
line. ( R-451-460)
7. Earl Johnson: A long-time district engineer for

the State of Utah described the custom and practice in
the State of Utah to never paint a lane dividing line without first painting the center line. He also described a
simple customary method of spotting the center of the
highway with paint spots or plastic markers to direct
traffic prior to placing the painted lines thereon. Johnson insisted that this was established by written directive
of the State of Utah, which incidentally, the State had
express,ly denied by its answers to interrogatories. ( R84) He also testified that he had observed that headlights are absorbed by new asphalt, and without striping
or temporary markings, one loses his bearings and becomes lost in the blackness. (R-460-496)
8. Alton Hoffman, Jr.: The superintendent for the

defendant Parson Construction Company confirmed
that he was well aware that a white skip line had been
placed upon the highway by the State, without a center
line. He testified that his duties terminated at the end
of the working day at which time numerous barriers and
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warning signs used in the daytime were taken down and
the "traffic was turned loose." He testified that the job
was within one-half day of completion when the accident happened. He also confirmed that the only signs
with respect to the project after quitting time were two
signs at the beginning and end of the project stating
"construction zone" or "construction ahead." (R-498-

524)

9. William L. Smith: The project engineer for the

job on behalf of the State of Utah indicated that he or·
dered the placing of the white skip line upon the highway, that it was done several days prior to the accident,
that he just as easily could have placed the center line
first, that he had never striped a project in the manner
of this job and that he knew of no directives from the
State with respect to the manner of painting newly re·
surfaced highways. Further that he could have placed
plastic spots delineating the center prior to painting and
that he had such material available. Numerous photo·
graphs and other exhibits were identified by Mr. Smith.
He also stated that in his experience, the surface of the
road would be different at the time of the accident than
in November of 1969. (R-525-605)
10. Daniel Jackson Faustman: An eminently quali-

fied traffic engineer, familiar with highway construe·
tion and maintenance projects throughout the United
States, described the condition as hazardous, as contrary
to all good construction practices, as containing mislead·
ing and false signals to the traveling public and as neces·
sarily causing the traveling public to assume the white
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painted line as the center line, resulting in a condition
like a "moth to the flame." He also stated the proliferation of the signs, not dealing with the condition, added
to the confusion, and that at a minimum, custom and
practice would have dictated spotting or "cat tracking,"
painting of the center line first, or temporary barricades.
(R-606-650)
11. Mavis E. Batt: The widow of Charles Batt and

the mother of David Batt, testified almost exclusively
with respect to damages. All of the damage witnesses
have been excluded from the transcript. The defendants,
however, requested that her testimony be included within the transcript. The Appellants know of no good reason
therefore, though perhaps it can be assumed from her
testimony that her son David, age 16, was driving the
vehicle rather than her husband Charles. With this, Appellants have no quarrel. (R-651-662)
DEFENDANTS' CASE
I. Jack Skewes: The State of Utah's "engineer for

construction" denied the existence of any standard specifications or written directives with respect to the procedures for striping highways and claimed it was left to
the project engineer. On cross-examination, he disclosed
for the first time that there existed a maintenance manual which dealt with the method of painting lines upon
highways. (R-674-681) This manual which was later
produced as Defendants' Exhibit 88, disclosed a complete system for the method of striping highways which
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was contrary to the method used by the State herein.
The manual provides:
"Purpose: The component parts of the Manual
of Instruction establish uniform policies and proced1;1res for Right-of-Way, Planning, Surveys,
Design, Construction Maintenance, Materials
Research, Administration and Traffic
of the Department of Highways. The manual is
designed as, nor does it establish, a legal standard
for these functions. Projects shall be completed
in conformance with the outlines contained in the
manua.
1"
"Exceptions are permissible where existing conditions indicate another acce_ptable solution; however, any such exceptions shall be based on the
results of a thorough engineering study. Changes
must be approved by the Division Head prior to
execution. The manual is published solely for the
information and guidance of the officers and employees of the Department of Highways."
13-746.23 Repainting "Many construction projects and nearly all maintenance resurfacing and
seal coat operations are subject to daily use by
traffic, therefore, to facilitate the orderly and
efficient movement of traffic it is necessary that
during bituminous surfacing and seal coat operations traffic lane markings be re-established just
as soon as possible. Lane spotting, if the markings
are frequent and conspicuous enough, is of itself
considerable assistance in controlling meandering
traffic movements, and should follow new surf acing work in most instances within 24 hours.
The application of the regular paint line shoul?
follow just as soon as possible, even though it is
realized that lane striping on new bituminous sur·
face deteriorates rather rapidly. Follow-up re·
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painting must be performed as soon as necessary
so that the center line traffic lanes and shoulde;s
are clearly designated at all times."
2. James N. Matlock: General manager for Parson

Construction indicated that the initial plans for signing
on the project were his, though Hoffman was required
to execute the signing each day, and that he specifically
discussed with Hoffman and approved the removal of
the signs and barriers at the end of each day and allowing the traffic to use its own judgment; and stated that
in his opinion the "construction ahead" signs were reasonable warning to the public of the condition ahead.
( R-682-704)

3. Paul C. Summers: An employee of the Utah

State Department of Highways, testified, over objection, that he used a coefficient measuring machine on
November 4, 1969, almost three months after the accident in question, and obtained two different coefficient
of friction readings of .81 for northbound traffic and .75
for southbound traffic, though clearly indicating he had
no idea whether the conditions were the same at the time
he conducted his test as they were at the time of the
accident. On cross-examination, he readily admitted that
different conditions as to temperature, type of surface
mixture, type of machine used, would result in entirely
different coefficient readings. ( R-704-720)
4. Ralph Jackson: A highway patrolman employed
by the State of Utah, placed the point of impact 1,250

feet north of where the new asphalt began by the weigh
station; and that on the evening of the accident he had no
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difficulty traversing the road, though he was entirely
familiar with it, and by a test a week before trial he could
observe headlights one-half mile up the road. He stated
he didn't think he was qualified to answer specifically
whether the tire marks were brake marks or scuff marks
or just tire marks in the new asphalt; that the tire marks
left by the decedent's vehicle were continuous, and that
in his opinion, over objection, the marks were scuff
marks. On cross-examination he concluded, however,
that he was unsure of the nature of the marks in view of
the photographs, particularly Exhibits P-5 and P-3, and
that these exhibits clearly showed the tread marks of the
Batt vehicle which was completely inconsistent with his
opinion as to scuff marks. That in his opinion the tire
marks did not indicate the car was out of control. (R720-751). (See pg. 5 of this brief).
5. Thomas H. Horrocks: Another patrolman employed by the State of Utah, described the tire marks as
continuous, the distance between them remaining the
same from beginning to end and generally moving from
the right side of the highway over to within a few inches
of the painted white skip line and then back to the point
of impact. (R-751-762)
6. Sargeant Ralph Cotter: Another Highway patrolman, described the general regulatory signs on the
highway and indicated that in his experience, barricades
or cones would have constituted a hazard to the motoring
public. (R-762-771)
7. Officer Ral,ph Jackson: Recalled by the State,
testified that he found some tire marks off the side of
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the road, south of the area of the tire marks on the highway and that he attempted to line them up with the tire
marks, but had no way of determining whether they
were from the same vehicle. (R-771-776)
8. Charles Arthur Guerts: The chief traffic engineer for the State of Utah Highway Department,
identified the maintenance manual (D-88) that the State
had earlier denied existed by interrogatory. He also
established that a traffic count on August 26, 1969,
showed an average of 5.3 vehicles per minute each direction between the hours of 9 :00 and 10 :00 p.m. He
also confirmed on cross examination that the striping
placed on the project in question did not conform to the
maintenance manual promulgated by the State. (R777-799)
9. Frederick Ray Wagner: 'Vas finally called to
present the defendants' defense, to-wit: that the decedents were speeding. Though there was an eye witness
to decedents' speed, i.e., Henderson was pulling away
from decedents at 40-45 m.p.h. (R. 290-320), a total
stranger to the facts was allowed to testify that speed
caused the accident. Under strenuous objection by Appellants that an improper foundation had been laid, the
witness was allowed to testify that in his opinion the decedents' vehicle was traveling at either 84 miles per hour
at the time of the collision, or 72 miles per hour or 57
miles per hour. Wagner based his opinions upon assumed facts not in evidence: ( 1) He assumed the tire
marks upon the highway were in a configuration contrary to all testimony of the officers, i.e., he assumed the
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marks overlapped at the beginning and end, and that
the right front and rear marks began far apart and converged, then widened again, and likewise for the left
front and rear. (R-822, 823, 835, 845, 847, 854); (2) He
assumed the measurements and diagram of the investigating officers were in error by ten feet. (R-852); (3)
He assumed the tire marks were critical scuff marks
'
that is, marks left by a car going at such speed in a curve
that it is sliding off the road or going to turn over. (R·
831, 845, 850, 870) ; ( 4) He assumed facts from out of
court discussions with police officers. (R-850, 851);
(5) And finally, he assumed a coefficient of friction,
based on a measurement three months later, there being
no testimony as to the coefficient at the time of the acci·
dent. (R-834, 852, 853) He admitted that if any of his
assumptions were inaccurate or incorrect that his opinion
as to speed would be inaccurate and incorrect. (R-808,
871}

As will be demonstrated in the argument that follows hereafter, the introduction of the foregoing evidence as to speed, despite its utter impropriety, coupled
with the instructions hereinafter referred to, resulted in
a directed verdict on the issue of contributory negli·
gence, and deprived the plaintiffs of a fair trial.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT, BY ALLOWING THE
OPINIONS OF :MR. WAGNER, BASED UPON
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ASSUMED FACTS NOT IN EVIDENCE,
EFFECTIVELY DIRECTED A VERDICT
AGAINST PLAINTIFFS.
The defendants in cross-examining Officer Gines,
the investigating officer, attempted to lay a foundation
for the speed opinions of Mr. Wagner by suggesting in
a leading question that the Batt tire marks were critical
scuffs. Over plaintiffs' objections, the Court allowed
Officer Gines to characterize the tire marks on the highway as "critical scuff marks". The following excerpt
from the records shows the improper manner in which
"critical scuff marks" was introduced for the first time
into the trial, obviously for the subsequent use of Mr.
Wagner:
"Q. All right. Now, there has been some talk about
critical speed marks and so forth. I know that's a
familiar term to people that are in the business of
investigating accidents as you are, but what is a
critical speed scuff?

MR. WILCOX: Your Honor, I don't-I don't
mean to be obstreperous. I object to the question
the form it is put. No testimony by any witness
has referred to that. Mr. Lybbert and Mr. Jensen have made reference to those marks. I move
that that-I object to that question as being a
Jury speechTHE COURT: Overruled. He may answer.
Q. (By Mr. Lybbert) Let
put it this way to
start with: Did you not testify that these marks
on the highway left by the Batt vehicle were
critical speed scuffs? Was that the term you
used?
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A. I don't believe we used 'scuffs'. We could
refer to.
but I did say that they
were critical. Cnhcal curve I believe I used.
Q. Critical curve?
A. Yes, sir, I believe critical curve marks is the
words I used in the deposition.
Q. I just want to use your terms. What type of
marks are these? How do they differ from a
straight brake mark?

A. critical curve mark left on the highway by
a tire from a vehicle is-well, okay. These critical
curve marks left by this vehicle on this highway
were critical curve marks from the weight of the
vehicle being turned quickly and we have the
four-wheel drift. The vehicle is fighting to either
get straight or go further around such as you do
when you get in a slide and these marks are what
is left on the highway by the tires when these tires
are still rotating. They were not locked up brake
marks. These tires were still going around but the
weight of the vehicle is pushed down as such and
it was such an angle that rather than go straight
it was leaving marks on the highway as it went
down. That is a critical curve mark." (R-429,

430}

It is obvious that the term "critical speed scuff" was
being used loosely. Then to make matters worse, the
trial court allowed the officer to opine as to the position
of the Batt vehicle prior to and while it was leaving the
marks on the road up to impact. Over objection, the officer was allowed to free-hand with a toy vehicle his
theories as to the position of the Batt vehicle, which positions are not preserved for the record. This testimony is
as follows:
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"Q. (By Mr. Lybbert) Would you step to the
diagram here with this little model and illustrate
if this
the
you step to the
board with that little diagram and illustrate your
testimony as to how in your opinion these skidmarks were left on the roadway?

A. Yes, I will.
MR. WILCOX: Your Honor, I'll object to this.
It is calling for opinions that he can't possibly
recreate.
Secondly, the road as he has got it here is completely out of proportion to the vehicle obviously
and the officer has testified to his best ability as
to what happened. Now, to have him try to show
it with and under such circumstances, I just think
is pure speculation and of no help to anybody
here.
THE COURT: I think if we bear in mind nothing is to scale on this diagram and it is just for
the purpose of showing the movement of the vehicle, is that correct?
MR. L YB BERT: Just illustrative, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: Yes, I think it is all right. Overruled. Go ahead Mr. Gines if you will.
THE 'VITNESS: Say this vehicle is going
down the road like this, now you are not going to
have any tiremarks. It is just going to be rolling
down the road. Is that correct?
Say this person turns his wheel sharply and
starts there.
Say he is going forty-five or fifty miles an
hour-
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MR. WIL.CO?C: Your Honor, now, here again
we are gettmg mto pure speculation as to matters
that are not helpful to the Jury. This was notspeed has not been entered intoTHE COURT: Well, you are assuming a speed
that is not in evidence apparently.
THE WITNESS: I shouldn't have said a
speed, Your Honor, but I was-I was not even
thinking of that. I was just using this as an illustration.
THE COURT: I appreciate that. It is just a
matter of illustration but just assume the nonnal
speed.

Q. (By Mr. Lybbert) \Vithout reference to any
particular speed.
A. Okay. If this car is going down here and this
driver twists this wheel to the left and he is traveling a rollable speed, when he twists this then he is
going to leave some marks on the highway is he
not?
Now, these marks we have here referring to the
photo over there are marks of a car in this position
and it is trying to go in this direction. This is west
and it is leaving-it is in this position. It is leaving critical curve marks on the highway and you
have four different sets of marks so you have a
larger wheel width than is on a normal vehicle.
See that?
You are moving like that. You are leaving marks.
Actually, your width is from here to here now at
a large angle outside to outside of the-
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MR. WILCOX: Your Honor, at this point may
I ask a question on voir dire?
THE COURT: Yes." (R-431, 433)
Whether the marks were critical speed scuffs, and
what was the movement and position of the vehicle are
questions involving complicated and sophisticated scientific knowledge. It was established that the term "critical speed scuff" has a very definite scientific meaning
and has application only to a sideways scuff left by a
vehicle just at the point in a curve where from speed and
other forces it must either slide sideways or roll over.
There are usually only one or at most two critical scuff
marks inasmuch as said marks are made only by the tires
on the outside of the curve, and such scuffs would not
display the tread pattern of the tires since the tire is
slipping and sliding sideways. The evidence was all to
the contrary which makes it quite apparent that the
officer was merely giving a gratuitous opinion. In the
case of Macshara vs. Garfield, 20 Utah 2d 153, 434 P.2d
756, the Court was concerned with a similar situation
where the officer attempted to simulate the vehicle speed
and movements from the physical evidence. The Trial
Court ref used to allow the officer to venture such opinions. The Supreme Court in upholding the Trial Court
said:
"'Ve think the trial court was correct in not allowing the officer to in effect reconstruct the accident and the speed and direction of the vehicles
on the basis of such physical evidence as: gouge
marks on the lawn and on the curbing, the dam-
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age to the automobiles, and the course he assumed
they took after the impact. The disallowance of
the evidence was in conformity with the rule that
such an opinion is not admissible if a layman of
ordinary intelligence can just as well interpret
the evidence as the experts."
The Court's error in the present case in allowing
Officer Gines to characterize the marks scientifically is
clearly prejudicial because a critical speed scuff must in
fact be precisely that before it has any application in the
formula used by Wagner which formula is discussed in
the Highway Collision Analysis text accepted by Wagner.
This error was then com pounded by the Court allowing the opinion testimony of Wagner wherein he
speculated as to the speed of the Batt vehicle. Wagner
admitted that the only basis he had for his opinions was
the assumption of several facts which are stated as follows with the applicable testimony fallowing:
I. That the marks on the road were critical scuff
marks as technically defined, he himself having never
seen them except in the photos which he admitted did
not appear to have the characteristics one would normally see in critical scuff marks, i.e., the tread pattern
was clearly visible and there were four distinct tire marks
of similar density and the inside tires began leaving
marks before the outside tires.

"Q. I understand that Mr. Wagner but what I
am saying is that you assumed, did you not sir, in
making this calculation that those marks are what
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are called sideway scuff marks made as-when a
car is at a critical speed and ready to speed out?
A. I assume that the vehicle was going at that
rate, yes.
Q. Are you familiar with this book Highway
Collision Analysis?

A. Yes.
Q. It is considered an authoritative work? I am
sorry to keep having you stand. Instead of having
you run back and forth, why don't you stand off
there.
I would read to you off of page fifty-three in
this book in referring to side scuff marks.
MR. JENSEN: Why don't you let him read
along over your shoulder?
MR. WILCOX: Okay.

Q. (Hy Mr. Wilcox) 'With passenger automobiles there is usually only one such mark laid
down.'
First of all, we have how many marks here?
A. I am not really clear on how many marks were
left.
Q. At least three, is that correct?
A. That could be.
Q. And you have assumed four on your drawing?
A. No, I have shown the scuffs of four.

Q. Okay.
A. Whether the wheel marks would go-Q. You have heard evidence-I am sorry. Yon
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have heard evidence that there were four marks
have you not by Officer Gines?
A. Yes. Yeah.

Q. 'It is usually left by the front tire on the the
outside of the turn. This is the one which is heavily leaded during the turn and consequently the
one which will leave the tire mark.'
All right. Now, in this particular example it
wasn't the outside tires that left the first mark; it
was the inside tires was it not?
A. According to these dimensions.'' (R-846, 847)
"Q. Nevertheless you haven't answered my question I don't believe Mr. Wagner and that is that
the opinions you have given us so far of speed
were based on that being a critical curve an<l
those being critical scuff marks sliding sideways?

A. I think I have said that, yes.
Q. And if they are not then your opinion of speed
here given is inaccurate?

A. Yes.
Q. And incorrect?
A. Yes.'' (R-856)
"Q. Just one other question. Would you agree
with this statement out of the Northwestern Book
also on page two hundred thirty-six: 'Characteristics of side scuff are close or diagonal striations
on the roadway as we showed in the other photo.
Many side scuffs and combination scuffs are
merely smudges or smears. Striations are narrow
and parallel like grooves, scratches or stripes on
a surface left by a tire grinding pavement.'
Would you agree with that statement?
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A. Let me read it all here.
Q. From here to here.

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And would you also agree with the
statement here that: 'When examining scuff
marks
the direction of striations and if you
make a f 1eld sketch show the directions on it.'
Would you agree with that statement as a good
practice for the investigating officer?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And so it would have been helpful had some-

body been able to tell you that those things actually existed would it not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. But they did not?
A. No, they didn't." (R-869)
2. That a tire mark configuration not in existence

existed. All of the officers testified that the marks remained relatively parallel and equidistant to one another
from beginning to end and with no cross over at the beginning or the end of the marks. Wagner baldly ignored
this fact and assumed that the marks crossed over at the
beginning and end and that the marks began wider apart
and converged and then widened again to the point of
impact. The clear dispute between the facts as established and as assumed by Mr. Wagner is illustrated on
the following pages by comparing Plaintiff's Exhibit 39
which shows Officer Gines' drawing of tire marks and
Defendant's Exhibit 93, to which Plaintiffs objected,
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which was Wagner's illustration of the probable movement of the vehicle in his speed calculation. \V agner had
to assume such configuration in order to support his
opinion that the vehicle was sliding.
"A. I think I have another one. Now, I don't
claim that I know that this was the motion of the
vehicle.
Q. Yes, sir.

A. I claim only that this is a possible motion." (R-

842)

"Q. All right. Now, you have a point here where
the right front and right rear marks are very far
apart do you not?

A. In D-93 and in factQ. Well, answer that question first.

A. Yes. You mean those two marks?
Q. Yes, sir.

A. Yes, sir.
Q. And in fact at one point here the marks cross
over in the middle? Between the outer perimeter
of the right and left marks there is a cross over of
marks?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. All right. The officer did not ever show that
on his diagram, did he?

A. No, he didn't.
Q. And he did not at any time indicate there was
a cross over did he?
MR. L YB BERT: Well, I am going to object to
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that, your Honor, as having him pass upon what
the testimony was of the officer.
MR. WILCOX: He is basing his opinionTHE WITNESS: I was here in Court.
MR. WILCOX: Lefs let Your Honor rule.
THE COURT: He may answer.
THE WITNESS: I was here in Court at the
time the officer indicated he thought there was
cross over within these lines but he could not identify the specific point.
Q. (By Mr. Wilcox) Now, Mr. Wagner, you
remember that the testimony of Officer Gines if
there were a cross over it was up here at Point 'A'
where the car started going back, isn't that correct?
A. He did not indicate the point.

Q. All right. Were you here yesterday?
A. Part of the time.

Q. Did you hear the officer-the officer's testimony that these marks were fairly uniform and
stayed together all the way back and did not cross
over?

A. I did, yes.
Q. Okay. So you have assumed a
marks that is inconsistent with the previous test1·
mony of at least some of the officers, is that correct?

A. Yes.
Q. And the only ha.sis
have for.
is that
you put the car in this position and this is. the way
the wheel marks ended up on your drawmg?
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A. No, I base this on this material that is represented to be a copy of the diagram that Officer
Gines prepared and which he prepared this Exhibit P-39.
Q. I understand that but the marks as you have
them are materially different than indicated by
Officer Gines on Exhibit P-39?

A.No.
Q. You say theseA. Not this distance.
Q. You say these look the same as those? Just
answer my question.

A. No, they do not." (R-843, 845)
3. D 93 and the testimony of Wagner were also
premised on the assumption by Wagner that the beginning points of the tire marks were improperly measured and recorded by the investigating officer. Wagner
assumed the measurement to be in error by ten feet and
proceeded with his analysis accordingly.
"Q. All right. All right. But you-all right. Then
you have also assumed that the measurements of
Officer Gines were incorrect, is that also correct?

A.No.
Q. At least those?
A. I assume that in order.to make a vehicle leave
that mark and I have indicated that in order for a
vehicle to leave that mark would have these two
dimensions I feel has to be in error.
Q. But you have assumed that one of them is
wrong have you not?
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A. Yes." (R-852)
"Q. (Mr.Jensen) Okay. So what conclusions can
you draw from all this?

A. I assume that there must have been an error in
recording some of the measurements.
Q. Which measurements would have-are out of
kilter here?

A. Well, the ones that describe the distance between the marks here would be the ones that
would be most suspect to error.
Q. Are you referring to the distance from the east
shoulder to 'A' south as fifteen feet six inches and
the distance measured from the east shouder to
'B' south as thirty-five feet nine inches? One of
those is off?
A. There would have to be an error in one of
those.
Q. What is the extent of the error? What kind of
an error are we talking about?

A. If we were to estimate what kind of an error
would be likely to occur I would think it would be
most likely an error in recording the first digit of
the measurement so I would assume that one of
these digits-first digits is off by one digit. For
instance, the measurement 'A-2' might be twenty·
five feet instead of fifteen feet. The measurement
'B' might be twenty-five feet instead of thirty·
five feet." (R-822, 833)
4. Wagner further assumed there was no braking at

all up to impact.
"Q. Just a couple of questions Mr. Wagner. Did
you also in assuming-in making your calcula-
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tion
there "Yas no braking being-no braking
of this automobile of any kind from the beginning
of the marks until the crash?

A. That's correct.
Q. You would have to do that wouldn't you?

A. I did that because if there were braking the
marks would be different.
Q. Not only that but-

A. The shape of them would be different.
Q. Not only that, if there was any braking on a
critical curve then the critical curve formula becomes meaningless does it not?
A. You would no longer have a spherical path.
As soon as you a pplied your brakes you would
break away and side scuff.
Q. Let me ask you if you agree with this: 'If
brakes are applied even a little the vehicle will
slide at a lower speed because both the curve and
the brakes tend to make it skid. If skidding occurs
only when the brakes are applied the estimate of
critical speed has little meaning?'
Would you agree with that statement?

A. If I could read it I think it would be easier to
understand.
Q. I'll read it to you: 'If brakes are applied even
a little the vehicle will silde at a lower rate of
speed because both the curve and the brakes tend
to make it skid. If skidding occurs only when the
brakes are applied the estimate of critical speed
has little meaning.'

My question-
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A. I am not sure what position in the book we are
taking-okay. It is critical speed.
Q. Yeah, critical speed.

A. Yes, if they were applied.
Q. Even a little?

A. A little.
Q. A little the book says?

A. But when you already have wheels sliding if
you put much of a force on the brakes at all then
it will break away and slide off in a different direction.
Q. You assumed in your opinion that there was no
braking at all?

A. That's correct." (R-867, 868)
5. As if this were not enough, Wagner then admitted

that his opinion was based on additional information that
he obtained out of Court from the investigating officers.
In that regard this Court in the case of State v. Linman,
96 Utah 180, 91 P.2d 451 (1939) stated:

". . . but the experts cannot give an opinion on
matters not observed by them or not in evidence
from the testimony of other ..."
"Q. Isn't the fact Mr. Wagner you are assuming
these are critical scuff marks are you not?

A. I think I am assumingQ. Answer my question.
A. It is in a critical speed tum.
Q. You are assuming that?
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A. Yes.

Q. You don't have any facts to prove that it is a
critical scuff mark other than the fact that you
are assuming isn't that correct?
A. I have had discussions with officers." (R-850)
"Q. (By Mr. Wilcox) Now, we have assumed
your opinion so far that you have given me were
not based on locked skid marks were they?

A. You asked me-

Q. Answer my question.
A. You have asked me to interpret my analysis
and what I am telling you is that I made several
analyses and then considered several alternatives
and this is the only explanation that I can make
fit the evidence-the data that I have been given
from the police report, observation of the photographs and discussions with the police officers."
(R-856, 857}
6. And finally, his opinion was based on a coeffici-

ent of friction arrived at during a test in November of
1969, three months after the collision.
"Q. All right. Now, you have also assumed a coefficient of friction have you not?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. And that's another question in your final conclusion is that correct?
A. Yes. We have taken the lowest value that we
thought would be appropriate for this type of
highway.
Q. Yes. I am sure you did. If it were in fact point
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three-fi"."e that would have some material bearing
on the fmal conclusions, is that right?
A. Yes, it would have.
Q. All right.
A. However, a road of this condition wouldn't
have a point three-five.
Q. Well, you don't know. You haven't measured
the coefficient as of the time of this collision did
you?
A. I did not measure it." (R-852, 853)
The speed opinions of Wagner were pure speculation and conjecture and their allowance constituted prej·
udicial error. Especially is this true in the present case
because of instructions on speed given by the Court
wherein the jury was instructed that if the speed of the
Batt vehicle were over forty miles per hour, the Plain·
tiffs were contributorily negligent.
The role of an expert witness is to assist the Jury in
interpreting facts and evidence. In the present case Mr.
Wagner made up his own facts to support his several
opinions which certainly were of no help to the Jury in
arriving at the truth, and deprived Plaintiffs of a fair
trial.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO PLAIN·
TIFFS' PREJUDICE IN GIVING DEFEND·
ANTS' INSTRUCTION NUMBER 25 AND
DENYING PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED IN·
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STRUCTION
SPEED.

NUMBER

23

REGARDING

The court, over plaintiffs' objection, instructed the
jury pursuant to defendants' request as follows:
"You are instructed that it was the duty of the
driver of the Batt vehicle to drive at such a speed
as was safe, reasonable and prudent under the
circumstances, having due regard to the width,
surface and condition of the highway, the traffic
thereon, the visibility, and any actual or potential
hazards then existing."
"The designated speed limit for the place in question was 40 miles per hour. This means that such
speed should ordinarily be regarded as safe, reasonable and prudent, in the absence of any special
hazards or conditions tending to make such speed
unsafe. But any speed in excess of such designated speed limit would constitute sufficient evidence to permit a finding that the speed was
greater than was safe, reasonable and prudent,
and that such conduct was negligent."
The plaintiffs claim that the instruction did not
properly state the law, improperly assumed the speed
limit to be 40 miles per hour, was fatally incomplete and
the practical effect of it was to direct negligence against
plaintiffs, unless plaintiffs' requested Instruction 23
were given, which instruction was denied by the Court.
Plaintiffs' requested Instruction No. 23 provided:
"The law of Utah provides that proof of speed in
excess of the speed limit establishes prima f acie
negligence, unless the plaintiffs show that the
speed of the Batt vehicle was reasonab.le :ind,,prudent under the circumstances then ex1stmg.
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Without this instruction, Plaintiffs were unable to argue
that any speed over 40 miles per hour was reasonable.
In the case of State vs. Lingman, supra, the effect
of the speed limit statute came to issue. There the De.
fendant was charged with involuntary manslaughter and
convicted. The lower Court had allowed in evidence the
Salt Lake City ordinance which made driving in excess
of 25 miles per hour in a residential district unlawful
"per se", whereas the State statute made 25 miles per
hour in a residential district "prima facie" evidence that
the speed was not reasonable or prudent. The Utah Su·
preme Court held that the City ordinance was invalid as
being in conflict with the State statute in that the State
statute was only a "prima facie" statute whereas the or·
dinance of the City was a "per se" statute. In explaining
the State statute the Court said on page 461 as follows:
"Under the statute if a person is charged with
driving at an unlawful speed because in excess of
25 miles in a twenty-five mile zone, evidence of
excessive speed is only prima facie evidence of
unlawfulness and he may introduce evidence as to
the surrounding circumstances on the theory that
he could exceed the stated figure and still be rea·
sonable and prudent, having due regard to the
traffic surf ace and width of the highway and the
hazard at intersections and any other condition
then existing. He has the right to overcome the
prima facie case ..."
It is clear from the language in the Lingman case
that whenever a party in an action is charged with viola·
tion of the prima facie speed limit that he has the right
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to rebutt the prima facie affect of the statute and show
that a higher speed was nevertheless reasonable and prudent. To take away that right would be to completely
disarm such party in regards to the speeding claim. Such
was the effect of the Court's instruction in the present
case. The Lingman case specifically held that the instruction that a speed in excess of 25 miles per hour constituted a crime was prejudicial and constituted reversible error. Numerous Courts have had the opportunity to
decide the specific question in issue here. Counsel for
Plaintiffs is unable to find any other Utah Supreme
Court cases except for the Lingman case which deal
with this question, however, many other states have confirmed the Lingman holding. In the case of Senkirik WJ.
Royce, 235 P.2d 886 Ore. (1951), the Plaintiff sued for
personal injuries alleging that the Defendant was operating its cab in excess of the speed limit of 25 miles per
hour as well as several other grounds of negligence. The
Court gave the following instruction concerning speed:
". . . and I further instruct you that if you find
from the evidence that the Defendants did at the
time and place of the accident, acting by and
through their driver of said taxi cab, Mr. Carlton,
operate said taxi cab, which collided with the
Plaintiff, at a speed in excess of 25 miles per
hour, then you would be justified in finding. as to
this charge that the Defendants were negligent,
and that such act of negligence in itself was
prima facie evidence that they were
said taxi cab at said time in excess of the md1cated
speed."
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The Oregon speed statute is similar to Utah's in that
it creates a prima facie effect of driving over the speed
limit and also recognized the so-called Basic Rule, i.e.,
that no person shall drive at a speed which is greater than
will permit the driver to exercise proper control of the
vehicle and to avoid colliding with any person or vehicle
on or entering the highway in the exercise of due care.
The Defendant objected to the instruction on the
grounds that it did not advise the jury that a speed over
the limit could nevertheless be reasonable and in the
form given it led the jury to believe that speed over the
limit would automatically constitute negligence. The
Court then found that the giving of the instruction con·
stituted reversible error and in doing so stated as follows:
"Manifestly, the part of the charge above em·
phasized is an erroneous statement of the law.
Under the express provisions of the statute, trav·
eling in excess of the indicated speed is a violation
of the law only if, in so doing, the traveler violated
the basic rule. The statute simply provides that
exceeding the designated speed is prima facie
evidence of the violation of such rule, but in
every case before a jury would be justified in
finding one guilty of negligence on
of
such speed, it would be necessary for it first to
find that the basic rule had in fact been violated
by reason thereof. Here, the ju!y
instructed
that speed in excess of twenty-five miles per hour
in and of itself constituted negligence,
at most it could only be taken as prima fac1e eVl·
dence ;f such negligence, subject to being over·
come by other evidence.
is a
c:lifferenc.e
between an act in and of itself constitutmg negh·
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gence, or being merely prima f acie evidence of
negligence. The statute simply provides a rule
of evidence.
"Under the statutes of this state (with certain exceptions unnecessary to mention here) there arc
no
limits' as such, traveling in excess of
which will, in and of itself, constitute a violation
of law. Speed of motor vehicles is regulated entirely by the provisions of the basic rule. Obviously, indicated speeds are not 'speed limits,' as was
indicated in the court's questioned instruction.
"The last few lines of the instruction are most
confusing. In effect, it is stated that 'a violation
of the indicated speed is prima facie evidence of
a violation of the indicated speed.' That doesn't
mean anything.
"In all cases where applicable the court may and,
if requested, should instruct the jury respecting
indicated speeds in accordance with the provisions of the statute and, in so doing, should also
explain what is meant by prima facie evidence.
It is noted that in the instant case there was no
such explanation, but no exception was taken on
account thereof; therefore, the question is not before us. Mercer vs. Risberg, 182 Or. 526, 188
P.2d 632.
"We have given careful attention to the entire
charge of the court to the jury and do not find
anything therein that would correct the error
above noted."
In the case of Hamlet vs. Hook, 236 P.2d 196, Cal.
(1951), a personal injury action, the Plaintiff had requested an instruction, under a statute the same as
Utah's which recited the Basic Rule and the prima facie
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speed limit, and also requested the Court to instruct that
a violation of the prima facie speed was negligence as a
matter of law. The Court declined to give this part of the
instruction and the appellate court sustained that refusal
saying that the prima f acie statute creates only an evidentiary presumption which may be rebutted and such
right to rebutt the presumption was a valuable right of
the parties charged with speed. In the case of Stapp vs.
Marshburn, 322 P .2d 803, Cal. ( 1959) , the Court reaffirmed the position taken in a long line of California
cases to wit, that it is improper to instruct in regards to
the prima facie statute unless the jury is also instructed
that even though the speed is in excess of the prima facie
limit there nevertheless must be a violation of the Basic
Rule, that is, that such speed was unreasonable under
the circumstances. The particular instruction in issue
stated as much and therefore was approved. The Court
also approved the Court's action in denying an instruc·
tion submitted by the Plaintiff advising the jury that a
violation of the prima facie statute was negligence.
The book of approved jury instructions, "B.A.J.l.",
prepared for use in California and followed in many
other states provides two instructions, No. 144 and No.
l 44A, both of which contain the following elements con·
cerning the Basic Rule and the prima f acie statute:
( 1) " ... Although a vehicle is being driven
a highway at a speed in excess of the prima
limit, such speed, nevertheless, might be
the exercise of ordinary care under the conditions
. .
,,
then ex1stmg ...
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( 2) ": ... and if the speed of a vehicle upon a highway is m excess of the applicable prima facie
limit, such speed is unlawful unless proved to be
not in violation of the basic speed law." and (3)
" ...,, that presumption, however, may be rebutted
In the following cases it has been held to be prejudicial error to give, or been held to be proper to refuse to
give an instruction, to the effect that a violation of the
prima facie speed was negligence per se or negligence as
a matter of law: Alabama - Streetman vs. Bowdon
(1940) 239 Ala. 359, 194 So. 831; Roberts v. McCall
(1944) 245 Ala. 359, 17 So. 159; Frith v. Studdard
(1958) 267 Ala. 315, 101 So. 2d 305; Brownell O'Hear
Pontiac Co. v. Taylor (1959) 262 Ala. 236, 112 So. 2d
463 (city ordinance) .
Arkansas - Herring v. Bollinger ( 1930) 181 Ark.
925, 29 s.w. 2d 676.
Idaho 74 P.2d 97.
Illinois -

Hopkins v. Pfeffer ( 1937) 58 Idaho 396,
Berg v. Mitchell (1915) 196 Ill. App.

509.

Kansas - Hamlet v. Hook (1915) 196 Cal.App.
2d 791, 236 P.2d 196 (applying Kansas statute).
Kentucky - Utilities Appliance Co. vs. Toon's
Admr. (1932) 241 Ky. 823, 45 S.W. 2d 478; Diamond
Taxicab Co. v. McDaniel (1935) 258 Ky. 478, 80 S.W.
2d 562; Long v. Cooper (1936) 262 Ky. 407, 90 S.W.2d
382; Electric Bakeries v. Stacy's Admr. (1936) 264 Ky.
431, 94 S.W.2d 977.
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Latham vs. Elizabeth City
Orange Crush Bottling Co. (1938) 213 N.C. 158, 195
S.E. 372; Woods v. Freeman ( 1938) 213 N.C. 314, 195
S.E. 812; Fleeman vs. Citizens Transfer & Coal Co.
(1938) 214 N.C. 117, 198 S.E. 596; Wooten vs. Smitn
(1939) 215 N.C. 48, 200 S.E. 921; Smart v. Rodgers
North Carolina -

(1940) 217 N.C. 560, 8 S.E.2d 833.

North Dakota - Erdahl v. Hegg, (1955), N.D. 98
N.W.2d 217 (city ordinance).
Ohio - Pettibone v. McKinnon (1932) 125 Ohio
St. 605, 183 N .E. 786; Wales v. V anderhood ( 1921) 15
Ohio App. 147; Schwenger-Klein Co. v. Williman
( 1923, App) 2 Ohio L. Abs. 521; Lazzara v. Hart
(1933) 45 Ohio App. 368, 14 Ohio L.Abs. 541, 187 N.E.
190; Dixon v. Yellow Cab Co. ( 1944, App.) 44 Ohio 1.
Abs. 107, 63 N.E.2d 926; Palmer v. Roof (1948) 84
Ohio App. 120, 39 Ohio Ops. 128; 62 Ohio L. Abs. 277,
82 N.E. 2d 748; Francais v. Cleveland (1948, App.)
53 Ohio L. Abs. 374, 85 N.E. 2d 522.
Oregon 235 p .2d 886.

Senkirik v. Royce (1951) 192 Or. 583,

The analysis set forth in these cases is directly ap·
plicable to the issues of the present case. The basic speed
rule is set forth in 41-6-46, Utah Code Annotated, as ii
also the prima f acie provision. The fact that the statute
itself does not state that the party charged with speed
may rebut the presumption is no support for the in·
struction given herein since, as Lingman and the cases
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noted above point out such right to rebut is a matter of
substantive law. An instruction drawn mereiy upon the
words of the statute would therefore be incomplete and
mis-leading. The instruction in issue does not in any
manner teach the jury that a speed in excess of the prima
facie limit may be reasonable under the circumstances.
It states only the fact that a speed under the prima facie
limit may in some circumstances be unreasonable and
that a speed over the limit justifies a finding of negligence. Plaintiffs' proposed instruction would have remedied this basic flaw and allowed plaintiffs to present
and argue their theory that the speed of the Batt vehicle
was reasonable. The court compounded the error by
stating the speed limit to be 40 miles per hour when there
existed a factual issue as to the speed limit at the scene.
The evidence showed that the collision occurred approximately 200 feet south of a 60 miles per hour sign and
approximately one-half mile north of the weigh station.
A 40 mile per hour zone through the weigh station was
indicated by a sign approximately one-half mile south of
the weigh station. The 40 miles per hour zone at the
weigh station was for the purpose of the weigh station
and as a practical matter ended for northbound traffic
once past the weigh station. Thus, the Plaintiffs' deceased driver was one-half mile beyond the weigh station zone, and was only 200 feet from a 60 miles per hour
sign at the point of the accident. This sign in shown
in Exhibit P-39 produced on page 26. Those facts
on their face present sufficient evidence from which
a jury could find not only that a speed of sixty
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miles per hour was reasonable and proper, but that the
speed limit was in fact sixty miles per hour. To tell the
jury therefore that any speed over 40 miles per hour wai
negligence constituted a directed verdict against the
Plaintiffs, since it is admitted that there was no evidence
that the Plaintiffs' deceased' s vehicle was traveling un.
der forty miles per hour. The Plaintiffs' evidence showed
that the decedents were probably traveling in the area ol
40 to 45 miles per hour at the time of the accident, which
under the circumstances the jury could have found to be
reasonable, and lawful. It must be assumed that the find·
ing of contributory negligence by the jury was a finding
that the Plaintiffs' driver was driving in excess of 40
miles per hour and, necessarily under the instruction
given, negligence as a matter of law.

POINT III
THE INSTRUCTIONS AS TO SPEED WERE
IMPROPER IN ANY FORM INASMUCH AS
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT SPEED
PROXIMATELY CONTRIBUTED TO THE
ACCIDENT IN QUESTION.
Speed alone is not ipso facto causative of a collision.
The obvious cause of the collision here was Plaintiffs'
deceased' s position on the roadway, and there is no evl·
dence that speed contributed to that position, as all offi·
cers agreed the car was not skidding and was
control. An analagous situation was in Peterson v. Niel·
sen, 9 Utah 2d 302, 343 P.2d 731 (1959), where the
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Plaintiff was traveling in excess of the prima facie speed
limit and hit the defendant who pulled out into the highway from a side road. The trial court had dismissed the
Plaintiff's claim on the basis of excessive speed and
failure to sound her horn. The Supreme Court held that
under the circumstances there was no relationship between speed and the cause of the accident and therefore
her claim could not be dismissed on that basis. In the'
present case, the record is devoid of any evidence relating speed as the cause of the accident. That issue
should not have been submitted to the jury.
POINT IV
BY GIVING INSTRUCTIONS 24 AND 27 THE
COURT REFUSED PLAINTIFFS' THEORY
OF NEGLIGENCE AGAINST DEFENDANT
PARSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY AND
DIRECTED A VERDICT OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS TO BOTH DEFENDANTS.

Instructions 24 and 27 are identical and were both
given and provide:
"It is the duty of a motorist driving upon the
highways to observe and take
of all lawful
for. the
signs which are placed along the
safety and guidance of all
usmg the highway.
"If you find that the driver of the
vehicle
failed to observe or take heed of such signs, then
such conduct on his part constitutes negligence."
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The first paragraph of the instruction undoubte&1
states in the abstract a duty applicable to the plaintiff;'
deceased driver, however, after once stating the duty i
was incumbent upon the Court in the instruction to ex.
plain that before there was a violation of the duty con·
stituting negligence the jury would have to find no\
merely that the driver failed to observe a sign and thui
was negligent, but rather that the signs in the area woula
have in some manner affected the conduct of the de·
ceased driver in regards to the occurrence of the accidenl
and that the driver's failure to observe or take heed ol
the sign was unreasonable and without due care under
the circumstances. The instruction as given directs the
jury to find negligence as a matter of law merely upon
a finding that the plaintiffs' deceased driver failed to ob·
serve and take heed of any one or all of the signs in thi
area. Plaintiff submits that most, if not all, of the sigru
in the area had no bearing on the accident herein (See,
P. 39, pg. 36. The error in the instruction was com·
pounded to the detriment of the plaintiffs, by the fact
that when the Judge instructed the Jury, he read Jn.
struction No. 27 twice, an identical instruction being in·
eluded as Instruction No. 24. The jury, following these
two instructions, could have found negligence on thf
part of the plaintiffs' deceased driver without even con·
sidering whether his conduct was reasonable or with due
care and whether the failure to see a sign or signs had
any causative effect on the accident.
These instructions also conveyed a more subtle error,
i.e., that Parsons fulfilled its duty by putting up an/
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kind of a sign. If the decedents were deemed contributorily negligent for failing to observe any lawful sign,
does it not follow that the practical effect was to instruct
the Jury that by Parson placing one lawful sign on the
project it had fulfilled its duty. The finding of the Jury
that Parson was not negligent is reasonably attributable
to the erroneous instructions and should be set aside.
POINT V

THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS AS
TO CAUSATION PREVENTED THE JURY
FROM CONSIDERING THE PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF THE DEFENDANTS' NEGLI-

GENCE.

The Court by its instruction number 16 advised the
Jury:
"The proximate cause of an injury is that cause
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which. the result
would not have occurred. It is the eff1cent cause
one that necessarily sets in operation the
factors that accomplish the injury." (Emphasis
added) (R-134).
And though there was no testimony or evidence
whatsoever as to an intervening cause, the Court by its
instruction number 17 advised the jury:
"An efficient intervening cause is one which interrupts the natural sequence of events, and prevents the natural and probable result of the
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original act or omission, and
a different
result by setting in motion the negligent force
that becomes the proximate cause of the injury
and which could not have been reasonably fore'.
seen." (R-135).
Accordingly, the only consideration the jury coula
give to an efficient intervening cause would be the causa.
tive result of contributory negligence, and as indicatea
above, the Court already had effectively directed thi
jury that contributory negligence existed.
There is no question but that the jury was seriouslr
concerned with the causation instructions given. After
the jury had deliberated more than two hours, the fore·
man called the trial judge and indicated that the jUIJ
wanted a dictionary in the jury room. The Court re·
turned the jury to the courtroom and the following dis·
cussion occurred:
"(WHERE UPON the Jury returned at 1:4a
o'clock, p.m.)
THE COURT: The record may show all Mem·
hers of the Jury are present in the Courtroom
and that all counsel are present.
Who has been elected foreman 1
MR. BERTOLA: I have, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Bertola?
MR. BERTOLA: Bertola.
THE COURT: T-0-L-A, right?
MR. BERTOLA: Uh-huh.
THE COURT: I see. Mr. Bertola, I have been

50

informed that you may have a question you wish
to ask me, is that correct?
MR. BER TOLA: We have a definition of a
word that we weren't clear on.
THE COURT: And what was that?
MR. BERTOLA: 'Proximately.'
THE COURT: In terms of proximate cause? Is
that what you are talking about?
MR. UERTOLA: Yes, that's correct.
THE COURT: If you will refer to Instruction
Number 16 that is defined and I will read it: 'The
proximate cause of an injury is that cause which,
in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
an efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred. It is the efficient cause-the one
that necessarily sets in operation the factors that
accomplish the injury."
I suppose-or should I suppose you have read
that?
MR. BERTOLA: Since we had the question we
found that Instruction. I think we are all clear on
it now.
THE COURT: Are you clear on it? You don't
want any other Instruction?
MR. BERTOLA: No.
THE COURT: Mr. Giles, you may take the
Jury back to deliberate. Let me ask you this:
What about lunch? Again, I am not urging you
go or not go. It is your pleasure.
MR. BERTOLA: Give us a little while longer,
please.
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THE COURT: You may take the Jury back to
the Jury Room with the Instructions Mr. Giles."
There being no evidence whatsoever of an inter·
vening cause, and the jury being repeatedly advised of
the doctrine of intervening cause, it seems most logical
that the jury construed intervening cause with respect
to the decedents' claimed contributory negligence,
and the Court had effectively directed the jury that
the decedents were contributorily negligent. Then
the Court instructs the jury that the directed con·
tributory negligence would constitute an intervening
cause. Instruction number 17
not properly talk in
terms of the conduct of a third person but merely at·
tempts a definition of intervening cause as an act in·
terrupting the original negligent actor, in this case the
State of Utah. Thus, the definition therein allows con·
tributary negligence as an intervening cause, and ex·
plains the finding of the jury in Interrogatory No. 5.
(R-239) Such finding cannot be justified by an inter·
vening act of a third person for the record is void of any
third party negligence or causation. There should not
have been any instructions as to intervening cause in any
of its aspects.
The Jury Instruction Forms for Utah, Page 49,
Paragraph 15.6, from which the causation instruction
No. 16 came verbatim, contains a comment by the com·
pilers thereof as follows :
"Note: Most of the difficulty with proxim.at.e
cause seems to arise from trying to state a
tion which will be of universal application in vari·
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ous hypothetical situations. It is suggested that a
great deal of
difficulty can be avoided, and
a much more snnple and understandable instruction be given, by dealing only with the case at
hand. In the great majority of cases there is no
serious problem of intervemng cause. In such instances, the first sentence of the above instruction, without the bracketed part, would seem adequate. The bracketed part,s are optional when the
facts and issues seem to require their use."
In the case of Kawaguchi v. Bennett, 112 U 442,
189 P 2d 109 (1948), the Court was concerned with the
effect of three causation instructions involving an injury to a young child. The Court approved an instruction wherein the question of intervening cause, to wit:
the acts of a third person, were withdrawn from the
jury's consideration because there was no evidence to
support the intervening cause contention. Likewise, in
the case of DeMUle v. Erickson, 23 U 2d 278, 462 P 2d,
159, (1969), this Court held as a matter of law that the
Court's instructions as to five separate bases of negligence were improperly presented to the jury inasmuch
as there was no evidence to support the same. That case
dealt with a headon collision of two vehicles wherein all
persons were killed and there were no eye-witnesses.
There was no evidence as to what the movement of the
defendant's vehicle was prior to impact and the Court
held that the jury could not be allowed to speculate as to
those circumstances. In this regard, the Court said on
page 162 of the Pacific Reporter:
"Instruction 24 permitted the jury to speculate
as to the circumstances prior to the accident; any
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evasive action which it may have been Spend.
love's duty to take would be dependent upon fac.
tors which were not in evidence. The trial court
in gi.ving Instruction 24, which merely ad.
vised the .Jury about abstract principles of law
which had no relation to any issue or evidence in
the case."
Such was the effect of the intervening cause in.
structions in the present case as they confused the jucy
as to causation, and allowed the jury to speculate re·
garding intervening causes.
CONCLUSION
The jury had little difficulty finding the State ol
Utah's conduct negligent, but by the opinion testimon1
allowed, without any basis to support same in the record,
and by the instructions referred to, the jury was directed
to find the plaintiffs contributorily negligent and to find
defendant Parsons Construction Company free from anJ
negligence, and plaintiffs respectfully submit that ther
are entitled to a new trial free from the unfair preju·
dicial errors contained in the first trial.
Respectfully submitted,
DRAPER, SANDACK &
SAPERSTEIN
Delbert M. Draper, Jr.
W. Brent Wilcox
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellanb
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